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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of the interaction between national and local policies
designed to reduce an environmental externality that causes environmental damages both na-
tionally and locally. We formulate a theoretical model to develop hypotheses regarding the
combined e¤ects of such policies on the stringency of the local policies and on rmsemissions
reductions. To test our hypotheses, we use actual data for Sweden, where emissions of nitrogen
oxides from combustion plants are subject to a heavy national tax and to individual emissions
standards set by county authorities. Our analytical ndings suggest that it is unlikely that
local regulators will impose emissions standards stringent enough to achieve further reductions
than those induced by the national tax. This is conrmed in our data, where most emissions
reductions can be attributed to the national tax and the e¤ects of the emissions standards are
not signicant.
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1 Introduction
The economic literature on regulatory federalism indicates that regulatory measures should, in
principle, be the responsibility of the lowest level of government whose jurisdiction encompasses
the relevant benets and costs associated with the regulated activity. In some cases, like air quality,
there are not only local e¤ects of pollution control, but also spillover e¤ects into other jurisdic-
tions. The implementation of national policies may partially internalize spillovers, but impose
uniform incentives ignoring local heterogeneity. When there are interjurisdictional spillovers, the
literature typically nds that decentralized policymaking produces socially ine¢ cient outcomes as
interjurisdictional spillovers are simply more important than local heterogeneity (see e.g., Banzhaf
and Chupp 2012 who nd that decentralized policymaking of US air pollution loses 31.5% of the
potential rst-best benets, whereas a uniform national policy loses only 0.2%).
Cooperation across jurisdictions is an alternative and appealing approach to addressing envi-
ronmental spillovers. But such cooperation is not always easy to come by if a race to the bottom
in environmental quality occurs as states compete for new investments or if states free ride (see e.g.,
Oates and Schwab 1998, and Markusen et al. 1995).1 Thus, spillover e¤ects across jurisdictions
present us with a fairly complex set of policy alternatives in practice. The rst-best measures of
economic theory may simply not be feasible. The available alternatives then include policy mixes
where not only central regulations but also local regulations that in some cases might override fed-
eral environmental regulations with tighter regulations of their own are implemented. This is the
case in, e.g., the United States and Europe, where environmental regulations are enacted and man-
aged at all levels of government: federal (i.e., national), state, and local. The regulations pertaining
to many major environmental problems for example, clean air, clean water, and hazardous waste
management are typically passed at the national level. Local regulators then pass regulations
that may restrict pollution beyond national requirements to address environmental problems for
which the local benets are high (see, e.g., Chupp 2011, who studies the ability of US states to
respond to local conditions through implementation of local policies).
1See also List and Gerking (2000) and Sigman (2005). List and Gerking (2000) test whether environmental
quality declined when President Reagans policy of new federalism returned the responsibility for many environmental
regulations to the states. They nd no evidence of a race to the bottom. In contrast, Sigman (2005) estimates the
costs of free riding among U.S. states under the Clean Water Act. Her results indicate that free riding gives rise to
a 4% degradation of the water quality downstream of authorized states, costing about $17 million annually.
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The interaction of policies raises important questions regarding the e¤ects of national actions
on the implementation and stringency of local regulations and viceversa. In particular, if the inter-
action between national and local policies a¤ects a countrys ability to achieve emissions reductions
and whether the policy overlapping leads to potentially ine¢ cient regulatory competition. The an-
swers to such questions certainly depend on the nature of the overlap between the two regulations,
their relative stringency as well as the types of instruments utilized. In the case of climate change,
the literature has shown, for instance, that the interaction between national and local regulations
becomes problematic if the national policy involves restrictions on aggregate emissions quantities.
That is, since the emissions reductions accomplished by a subset of local governments reduce pres-
sures on the constraints posed by the national policy, facilities are encouraged to increase emissions
in other states leading to "emissions leakage" and a loss of cost-e¤ectiveness at the national level.
In contrast, when the national policy involves xed prices, more aggressive local policies in a subset
of states would generally lead to di¤ering marginal abatement costs across local jurisdictions and
reduced cost-e¤ectiveness (see e.g., Goulder and Stavins 2011).
In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of the interaction between national and local policies
designed to reduce local air pollution in Sweden, where emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) from
combustion plants are subject to a heavy national tax and most (but not all) are also subject
to individual emissions standards set by county authorities. These policies were implemented
to control the serious soil acidication and water eutrophication problems that Sweden faced in
the 1980s, which were caused partly by NOx emissions from combustion processes in transport,
industry, and power generation. In 1992, Sweden introduced a high tax on NOx emissions from
large combustion sources (e.g., power plants, industrial plants, and waste incinerators). The tax
was initially set at a rate of 40 SEK per kilogram of NOx emitted from any stationary combustion
plant producing at least 50 megawatt hours (MWh) of useful energy per year. This corresponds
to 6,000 USD/metric ton, which is much higher than the hundreds of dollars commonly seen in
the US programmes for NOx permits (Sterner and Höglund-Isaksson, 2006). Individual emissions
standards for NOx (so-called emission limit values, ELVs) had also been introduced in the late
1980s, and thus for some combustion plants ELVs were already in place when the charge was
introduced (Sterner and Höglund-Isaksson 2006). This is to say, the regulations were additive
and the plants that were subject to both types of regulations had to comply with both. We set
up a theoretical model to develop a series of hypotheses regarding the combined e¤ects of such
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policies on the stringency of the emissions standards and on rmsemissions reductions. We use
actual data to test our hypotheses. Since there is no centralized comprehensive information on the
emissions standards and how they have developed over time, we collected such information from
each of the county authorities and merged it with the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency
(SEPA) database, which covers the combustion plants monitored under the Swedish NOx tax.
Thus, we built a unique database that allows us to investigate the e¤ects of the implementation of
the national tax on the stringency of the ELVs and the combined e¤ects of the national and local
policies on abatement e¤orts.
To the best of our knowledge, the closest paper to ours is the one by Williams III (2012)
who investigates the growing state-federal conicts in environmental policy. He argues that the
observed patterns of regulation in the United States where federal legislation serves as a minimum
oor beyond which states can move ahead and set stricter regulations can be explained by a shift in
the type of regulation used at the federal state, from command-and-control toward incentive-based
regulation. This shift implies that a state imposing a tighter regulation will bear only part of the
additional cost - and thus has a stronger incentive to tighten regulation than it does under federal
command-and control. Thus, Williams III (2012) concludes that for a pollutant that causes any
local damage, the average state will want to impose its own tax.
In contrast to Williams III (2012), who focuses on the case where both national and local
governments regulate emissions via the same instrument, we study the case of a mixed policy
instrument with a tax at the national level and command-and-control at the local level. In such
a setting, we nd that even though the stringency of the standards increases when standards are
combined with a national tax, it is unlikely that local regulators will impose emissions standards
stringent enough to achieve further reductions than those induced by the national uniform tax.
Such a result is also observed in our data, where most emissions reductions can be attributed to
the national tax and the e¤ects of the ELVs are not signicant. Hence, our paper provides evidence
of the e¤ects of interactions between national market-based policies and local regulations, showing
that not all mixes of policies create positive interactions that lead for further levels of environmental
protection, and thus the choice of policy mix has important implications in terms of environmental
outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the theoretical model conceptualiz-
ing how the implementation of the national tax might a¤ect the stringency of the local regulations.
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The empirical strategy is described in the subsequent section, followed by a description of the data
used to set up the study case. Next, we describe the main results and conduct a number of robust-
ness tests. The nal section presents the main conclusions and discusses the policy implications of
our results.
2 The Model
Assume one country made up of n counties. In each county there is a polluting rm that emits
a pollutant that causes environmental damages both nationally and locally. Pollution damage in
county i can be represented as Di(ei; E), where E is the nationwide level of emissions given by
E =
Pn
i=1 ei. Thus, environmental regulation will have local and national benets.
2 The function
Di(ei; E) is twice di¤erentiable and convex in both arguments. The cost of emissions reductions in
county i is given by the function Ci(ei), which is twice di¤erentiable, decreasing and strictly convex
in ei.3
In this setting let us start by analyzing (i) rst-best regulation, followed by the case where
(ii) only national or local governments regulate emissions, and then conclude with the case of (iii)
policy overlapping where both national and local regulators implement policies to reduce emissions.
Like Williams III (2012), we assume that governments incur some cost of imposing a policy, yet this
cost is arbitrarily small. To mirror the Swedish context, we focus on the case where the national
regulator sets a uniform emissions tax and the local regulators set command-and-control regulations
in the form of emissions limits. Moreover, the national regulator commits to maintain the tax rate
once it has been set. Thus, local regulators cannot a¤ect the level of the tax via their choices of
2As described by Williams III (2012), making damages a function of both local and national emissions allows this
model to represent cases where a pollutant has only local e¤ects (in which case, @Di=@ei > 0 and @Di=@E = 0), only
national e¤ects (in which case, @Di=@ei = 0 and @Di=@E > 0), and both local and national e¤ects (in which case,
both partial derivatives are positive). This last case could be a single pollutant with both local and national e¤ects,
or two pollutants that are highly correlated and identically a¤ected by e¤orts to reduce emissions. For instance, the
environmental impact of chemically reactive air pollutants on both local air quality (smog) and the regional ecosystem
(acid rain) is well established, i.e., NOx concentrations, in both polluted cities and the remote troposphere, play the
dominant role in tropospheric ozone production. Moreover, ozone can be transported by wind currents and cause
health impacts far from the sources.
3Note that the cost of emissions reductions in one state does not depend on emissions reductions in any other
state, which rules out any cost-side spillovers.
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stringency of local emissions standards (only the level of abatement by the local rm).
2.1 First-Best vs. Decentralized Policies
Let us assume that the national regulators objective is to minimize the sum of all pollution damage
and the costs of reducing emissions in all counties:
min
ei
nX
i=1
[Ci(ei) +Di(ei; E)] ;
which leads to the following FOC for ei:
 @Ci(ei)
@ei
=
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
+
nX
j=1
Dj(ej ; E)
@E
; (1)
for j = 1; :::; n. That is, optimal emissions in each county i are such that the marginal cost
of emissions reductions in that county equals the marginal damage from pollution emissions in
county i plus the national-level e¤ects of emissions of county i on all counties. It is well known
in the literature that the rst-best regulation can be implemented through di¤erentiated emissions
standards per county - set at the level dened by equation (1) - or through di¤erentiated tax rates
 i equal to:
 i =
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
+
nX
j=1
@Dj(ej ; E)
@E
: (2)
Note that under di¤erentiated taxation, the stringency of the local regulations will be larger in
counties where the local damages of pollution are greater and counties that cause larger inter-state
spillover e¤ects on other counties. However, as discussed before, di¤erentiated rst-best policies
might not be politically or legally feasible. In practice, the majority of existing and planned market-
based emissions regulations are implemented as spatially uniform undi¤erentiated policies where
all regulated emissions are penalized at the same tax rate. Hence, let us assume that the national
regulator decides on a uniform tax rate T and that polluting rms in each county want to minimize
the sum of abatement costs Ci(ei) and tax payments Tei. The national regulator solves:
min
ei
nX
i=1
[Ci(ei(T )) +Di(ei(T ); E(T ))] ;
subject to the rmsimplicit reaction function:
 @Ci(ei)
@ei
= T 8 i: (3)
6
It is easy to show that the uniform tax rate T corresponds to the average marginal damage
across counties. Indeed, the FOC determining the optimal level of emissions in each county i is
given by equation (1). Summing up these FOCs for all counties, we obtain that
nX
i=1
 @Ci(ei)
@ei
=
nX
i=1
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
+
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
@Dj(ej ; E)
@E
:
Furthermore, given the rmsimplict reaction function in equation (3) we know that
nX
i=1
 @Ci(ei)
@ei
= nT;
and thus:
T =
1
n
nX
i=1
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
+
nX
j=1
@Dj(ej ; E)
@E
: (4)
Comparing equations (2) and (4) it is straighforward that the uniform tax rate is only optimal
when the marginal damage from pollution is the same for all states. Otherwise, it will not yield
the rst best: the uniform tax would be too low for those counties where local damages are high
and too stringent for those counties where local damages are low.
Let us now consider the case of decentralized policy implemented in the form of emissions
standards bei: County i0s objective is to minimize the local cost of reducing emissions plus pollution
damages to the county,
min
ei
Ci(ei) +Di(ei; E); (5)
which yields the following FOC:
 @Ci(ei)
@ei
=
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
+
@Di(ei; E)
@E
: (6)
From equation (6), we know that counties set emissions standards bei such that marginal cost
equals marginal damage (including only damages within the county and not damage to other
counties). Moreover, comparing the marginal costs in equations (4) and (6) of emissions reductions
under a uniform tax and decentralized emissions standards, it is straightforward that the emissions
reductions achieved in those cases where local governments implement decentralized emissions
standards will generally be smaller than the emissions reductions achieved when only the national
government regulates emissions by means of a uniform tax. Indeed, the only exception to this is the
case where the local environmental damages of pollution are very high and the inter-jurisdictional
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spillovers are small (e.g., the second term on the right hand side of equation (7) is negligible), such
that the following condition holds:
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
>
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
@Dj(ej ; E)
@ej
+

n
n  1
 nX
j 6=i
@Dj(ej ; E)
@E
(7)
That is, the local damages to jurisdiction i must be larger than the average local damages
in all other jurisdictions plus the sum of damages of the interjurisdictional spillovers caused by
jurisdiction i on all the other jurisdictions. Consistent with the empirical literature that nds that
decentralized policymaking produces larger welfares losses than a uniform national policy since
interjurisdictional spillovers are more important than local heterogeneity of damages, we argue
that cases where condition (7) holds are rare and characterized by large heterogeneity in damages
across counties (e.g., pollution hot spots) and small spillovers. In contrast, if we would assume that
all counties are symmetric in terms of the damages of air pollution and costs of emissions reductions,
it would be easy to show that the emissions reductions would be larger under the uniform national
tax (see Appendix A).
2.2 Policy Overlapping
Let us now analyze the case where the national regulator decides on a uniform tax rate T and
the local regulator sets (or revises) emissions standards bei after observing the uniform tax rate
set by the national regulator. Thus, the timing of the regulatory game is as follows. First, the
national regulator sets the uniform tax rate T to minimize nationwide pollution damages and costs
of pollution control. Second, local regulators set emissions standards bei. Finally, rms decide
on pollution abatement. By backwards induction, we know that if both levels of government
implement regulations, rms emissions will be determined by the tighter regulation, and thus
ei = min [ei(T ); bei], where ei(T ) corresponds to the solution to the rms implicit reaction function
in equation (3) and bei corresponds to the local emissions standards.4
Given the tax T , the local regulators set emissions standards bei to minimize the cost of reducing
emissions and pollution damages to the county, plus the national emissions tax paid by the local
rm to the national government, net of any revenue returned to it as a lump sum. Let ri represent
the share of national emissions tax revenues that are returned to county i (which is assumed to be
exogenous). County i0s objective function can now be represented as:
4Firms now minimize the sum of abatement costs Ci(ei) and tax payments Tei subject to the constraint ei  bei.
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min
ei
Ci(ei) +Di(ei; E) + Tei   ri
nX
j=1
Tej ; (8)
which yields the following FOC:
 @Ci(ei)
@ei
=
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
+
@Di(ei; E)
@E
+ T [1  ri] : (9)
From equation (9), we know that counties set emissions standards bei such that the marginal cost
equals the marginal damage (including only damages within the county and not damages to other
counties) plus the national emissions tax rate (net of return transfers to the county). Thus, com-
pared with the FOCs in the case of decentralized policy given by equation (6), we should expect
emissions standards to be more stringent in the case of overlapping policies since a more stringent
standard incentivizes increased emissions reductions, allowing counties to reduce the tax payment
to the national government. The increased incentive due to tax payments is the largest when there
is no tax redistribution (and thus, ri = 0, implying that the county pays the full tax) and disappears
if ri = 1, since then the county gets the tax fully returned.
So far we have shown that emissions standards become more stringent when they are combined
with a uniform tax rate, but if they are not stringent enough to be binding, they will have no e¤ect
on the level of emissions reductions by the rm. This is to say, min [ei(T ); bei] = ei(T ). In such a
case, the emissions reductions will be determined by equation (3), and the unique Nash-equilibrium
tax rate T is then dened by equation (4).
Let us now analyze the case where the emissions standards bei are binding (at least for a subset of
counties). Then, the marginal cost of abatement to the rm in county i is equal to  @Ci(ei)@ei bbei> T .
Making use of such an inequality allows us to represent equation (9) as:
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
+
@Di(ei; E)
@E
> Tri: (10)
By substituting equation (4) into equation (10) we nd a condition determining when emissions
standards are binding under overlapping policies compared with the case where only standards are
in place:
@Di(ei; E)
@ei
>

ri
n  ri
 nX
j 6=i
@Dj(ej ; E)
@ej
+

nri
n  ri
 nX
j 6=i
@Dj(ej ; E)
@E
 

n [1  ri]
n  ri

@Di(ei; E)
@E
: (11)
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Note that if ri = 1, condition (11) simplies to that in equation (7). Hence, policy overlap would
have no e¤ect on the stringency of the emissions standards since there are no additional benets of
increased stringency in the form of reduced tax payments because the tax is fully refunded. If we
instead assume that ri = 0, the emissions standards become binding as increased stringency reduces
pollution damages and tax payments. Finally, let us assume that counties are symmetric in terms
of the damages of air pollution and costs of emissions reductions. As shown in Appendix B, under
such assumptions there is a critical refund r that determines whether the emissions standards
become binding. If ri > r, the emissions standards will not be binding, while the opposite holds
for ri < r.
All in all, our analytical results suggest that emissions standards are more likely to be binding
when combined with a uniform tax that is not fully refunded to the county. As explained before, un-
der such policy overlapping, local regulators have an additional incentive to increase the stringency
of standards to incentivize more abatement and a reduced tax payment to the national government.
Thus, in line with Williams III (2012), our results suggest that the use of a market-based national
regulation leads local regulators to impose tigher regulations. However, the mechanism is slightly
di¤erent in his paper since when local regulators implement taxes, local regulators imposing a
tighter regulation will only bear part of the additional cost of the tax. In contrast, in our case,
local regulators implement tighter emissions standards (than they would have in the absence of the
national regulation) to reduce the tax payment to the national government.
Hence, we can conclude that when the national and local regulators implement regulations to
restrict emissions, the emissions standards set by local regulators might become more stringent
than in the case where they are the only policy in place. It is unclear, however, whether they will
be stringent enough to achieve further reductions beyond those induced by the national uniform
tax. This is likely to happen in cases where local environmental damages are large and pollution
spillovers are small.
3 NOx emissions regulations in Sweden
For geological reasons, Sweden is particularly vulnerable to acidication, causing negative impacts
on lake and forest ecosystems. Consequently, NOx emissions have been an important environmental
policy target in Sweden. For instance, in 1992, a tax on NOx emissions from large combustion plants
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was introduced. The tax was accompanied by a refund according to the amount of useful energy
generated to ensure that facilities with low NOx emission intensities would be net beneciaries of
the scheme (see Bonilla et al. 2018). At the time when the tax was implemented, close to 25%
of Swedish NOx emissions came from stationary combustion sources and the tax was seen as a
cost-e¢ cient way to reduce NOx emissions. Regulated entities belong to the heat and power sector
(from 1992 to 2012 on average of 50.5% of all boilers), the pulp and paper industry (14.1%), the
waste incineration sector (11.8%), and the chemical (6.8%), wood (9.8%), food (5.5%) and metal
industries (1.5%). Initially, the tax requirement only covered boilers and gas turbines with a yearly
production of useful energy of at least 50 GWh. However, because of its e¤ectiveness in reducing
emissions and simultaneously falling monitoring costs, in 1996 the tax system was extended to
include all boilers producing at least 40 GWh of useful energy per year, and in 1997 the limit was
again lowered to 25 GWh (Sterner and Höglund-Isaksson 2006). From 1992 to 2007, the tax was
40 SEK/kg NOx, but in 2008 the tax was raised to 50 SEK/kg NOx following a series of reports
from the Swedish EPA indicating that the impact of the tax system had diminished over the years
(SEPA 2012). In real terms, the tax had decreased over time and the increase to 50 SEK in 2008
was in practice a mere restoration of the tax to the real level in 1992.
SEPA manages the tax on NOx emissions at a small administrative cost amounting to 0.2
0.3% of the total revenues. The entire remaining tax revenue is refunded to the same collective
of polluters in proportion to their output of useful energy. Useful energy produced has been
accepted as a relevant and neutral yardstick for measuring output from this heterogeneous group
of industries since the main goal is to a¤ect combustion technologies. For power plants and district
heating plants, it is equal to the energy sold. For other industries, the energy is dened as steam,
hot water, or electricity produced in the boiler and used in production processes or heating of
factory buildings (see Sterner and Höglund-Isaksson 2006).
Individual emissions standards for NOx emissions from stationary sources (hereinafter, ELVs)
were introduced in the late 1980s and thus, for many boilers (but not all), they were already in
place when the tax was introduced. They are determined case-by-case either by either one of the 21
regional County Administrative Boards (CABs) or one of the ve Environmental Courts.5 There
5We restricted the period under study to 19802012 because after June 1, 2012, coordination across counties
was enhanced since only 12 CABs were responsible for issuing the operating licenses (instead of 21: see, e.g., SFS
2011:1237).
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is no legal limit for how long an ELV specied in an operating license is valid, though the common
practice seemed to have been that operating licenses and ELVs are revised about every ten years.
Firms must, however, apply for a new operating license if they make large changes to the operations
(e.g., if they install a new boiler or retrot a boiler to use a di¤erent type of fuel). In addition,
there can be appeals that change the original permissions, or postpone the implementation of
requirements specied in the operating license. Regarding enforcement, if a rm violates the ELV
specied in the operating license, it risks criminal charges and could face nes determined in court.
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive data on the ELVs and how they have developed over
time. Therefore, for the purpose of the present research we collected information about boiler-
specic ELVs (specied in the operating licenses of the plants) for the rms regulated under the
NOx tax. In particular, the gathering of ELVs data proceeded as follows. We gathered information
for all rms included in the NOx database over the period 19922012. These corresponded to 392
rms whose operations were distributed across 434 plants located all over Sweden. We contacted
all of the CABs hosting the 434 plants from October 2013 to June 2014. We provided each CAB
with a list of the plants of interest and asked them to provide all the permissions connected to all
boilers operating at that plant over the period 19802012.6
Figure 1 shows the average highest wintertime annual ambient concentration of NOx per county
19862012. As can been seen, the ambient concentration of NOx varies across counties, with the
highest concentrations found in the most populated counties (e.g., Stockholm, Västra Götaland
and Skåne) and the lowest concentrations found in Jämtland and the southeastern part of the
country (e.g., Blekinge, Kalmar, Kronober, Södermanland, and Gotland). According to the Swedish
Environmental Quality Standards, the binding upper limit for ambient NO2 concentration is 40
g/m3 as a yearly average (SEPA, 2014). From 1986 to 2012, this limit was exceeded in ve Swedish
counties, namely, Stockholm, Västra Götaland, Skåne, Västerbotten och Västernorrland.
Table 1 summarizes the number of boilers subject to ELVs and the NOx tax. In total, there
are 935 boilers included in the dataset. Out of these, 240 have only been subject to ELVs, 116
6Moreover, in Sweden, all environmentally hazardous activities that require environmental permission for operation
must on a yearly basis provide the monitoring agency with an annual environmental report in which they describe
their environmental impact and in what ways they comply with the regulations and restrictions that apply to them.
For the purpose of tracking permissions over the years, these reports were used to double check that no permissions
had been overlooked by the CAB or other authorities.
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Figure 1: Average Highest Wintertime Ambient NOx Concentration per County 1986-2012
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have only been subject to the tax, while 579 have been subject to both ELVs and the NOx tax at
least one year since 1992. ELVs are, however, expressed in di¤erent units and in order to perform
our empirical analysis we focus mainly on emissions standards expressed in mg NOx per MJ added
energy to make it comparable to the unit used for the NOx tax. Thus, our empirical analysis will
be based on 867 boilers, out of which 741 have been subject to ELVs and 516 have been subject to
both regulations.
As shown in Table 1, the stringency of ELVs has increased signicantly over time (by about
44%, decreasing from an average of 187.05 mg/MJ before the implementation of the tax in 1992 to
104.86 mg/MJ after that). Moreover, the increased stringency is more pronounced for the group
of boilers subject to both regulations than for those only subject to ELVs , e.g., a 48% vs a 31%
reduction, respectively (see also Figure 4 in the Appendix for a plot of the trends over time).
ELV Stringency (mg/MJ)
N Nmg=MJ Before 1992 After 1992
ELV-Tax 579 516 193.23 101.05
Only ELV 240 225 165.17 113.90
Total 819 741 187.05 104.86
Actual Emissions Concentration (mg/MJ)
Nmg=MJ 1992-2012
ELV-Tax 516 65.82
Only Tax 116 80.88
Total 632 68.2
Table 1: Number of boilers subject to ELVs/Tax
Regarding actual emissions concentrations, unfortunately we only observe this information from
the year 1992 onward for the boilers subject to the NOx tax (as such information is only available
from the SEPA NOx tax database). We can see, however, that the actual emissions concentrations
for the boilers subject to both regulations is about 19% lower than that for the boilers subject only
to the tax.
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the values of ELVs and actual emissions concentration
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Figure 2: ELVs vs. Actual Concentration by County 1992-2012.
(both expressed as mg/MJ) per county for all observations 19922012. In the sample of 857 boilers,
the counties with the largest numbers of boilers are Västra Götaland (136 boilers), Skåne (117)
and Stockholm (99). Gotland, Jämtland and Uppsala are the counties with the fewest boilers (4,
12 and 18, respectively).
Figure 2 is consistent with a fair deal of variation in the stringency of ELVs across counties. The
average ELV stringency for all boiler observations within counties varies between approximately 95
and 213 mg/MJ, with a mean of about 104 mg/MJ. Boilers in Jämtland seem to be, on average, the
most leniently regulated, whereas boilers in Södermanland and Östergötland seem to be slightly
more stringently regulated. We also observe that there is a lot of within-county variation in the
stringency as well. In Jämtland, for example, the stringency ranges from 60 to 300 mg/MJ. The
smallest variation in stringency is observed for Gotland, yet this is also the county with the fewest
observations.
Furthermore, from Figure 2, it appears as if ELVs have not been binding over the period,
on average (e.g., the average actual emissions concentration across counties varies from 45 to 87
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Figure 3: Total NOx Tax Revenues Refunded to Counties 1992-2012.
mg/MJ, with a mean of about 68.2 mg/MJ). However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the
ELVs were binding for some boilers at some point in time.7
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of shares of the tax revenues refunded to the
counties. Note that if tax revenues were to be distributed evenly across counties, each should
receive around 5% of the tax revenues. From the gure, it is clear that the distribution is uneven,
with the counties with the largest number of boilers (Västra Gotaland, Skåne and Stockholm)
receiving much larger shares of the refunds. The gure also shows that the distribution of tax
revenues refunded to each county varies across the years.
What hypotheses can be derived from our analytical framework? One is that ELVs are more
7 Indeed, out of 4,616 observations for which an ELV (mg/MJ) and the NOx tax apply simultaneously, the actual
NOx concentration exceeds the maximum limit specied by the ELV in a given year only for about 485 observations
(10.5%). This observation is consistent with evidence from the Swedish Protection Agency (SEPA), which in 2003
evaluated of the e¤ect of the ELVs for the period 19972001 and concluded that, because emissions were generally
much below the ELVs, the NOx tax was more e¤ective than the ELVs in reducing NOx emissions.
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stringent for boilers subject to both regulations than for boilers only subject to ELVs. A second
hypothesis is that since ELVs are not expected to be binding, most emissions reductions have been
achieved thanks to the implementation of the national tax.
In what follows, we verify the empirical validity of these hypotheses.
4 Econometric Model
We wish to evaluate i) the impact of the introduction of the NOx tax on the stringency of the ELVs.
Moreover, ii) we wish to analyze whether the actual emissions concentrations are driven mainly by
the NOx tax or the ELVs. Below, we explain our methodological approach in each case.
4.1 Evaluating the e¤ects of the NOx tax on the stringency of the ELVs
Since di¤erent boilers were a¤ected by the NOx tax at di¤erent points in time (as the size threshold
changed in 1996 and 1997), we divide our boilers into three groups. Group 1 (G1) includes all boilers
with a yearly production of useful energy of at least 50 GWh. G1 began being regulated by the tax
already in 1992. Group 2 (G2) includes all boilers with a yearly production of useful energy in the
]50; 40] GWh range. G2 became regulated by the tax in 1996. Finally, Group 3 (G3) includes all
boilers with a yearly production of useful energy in the ]40; 25] GWh range, which became subject
to the tax in 1997. Table 2 presents statistics of the mean ELV stringency before and after the
treatment for each group. In all cases, the stringency of ELVs after the treatment is statistically
higher than the stringency of the ELVs after the treatment. Nevertheless, as shown in the table,
the increased stringency is larger for G1 than for boilers in G3 and G2.
ELV Stringency (mg/MJ)
Group N Before Treatment After Treatment Di¤.
G1 380 199.65 100.03 99.62
G2 37 123.54 106.64 16.90
G3 99 123.25 101.21 24.03
Table 2: Number of Boilers per Treatment
For the sample of all boilers in operation by 1992 (hereinafter, OldBoilers), we estimate a
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di¤erence-in-di¤erence model to analyze the e¤ect of the implementation of the tax on G1 by using
the information available from 1980 to 1995. For this group, we observe the ELVs in two time
periods, D_92 = 0, 1, where 0 indicates years before G1 received treatment (i.e., before 1992) and
1 indicates a time period after G1 began receiving treatment (i.e., 19921995). The control group
includes all boilers in operation by 1992 that were never subject to the tax plus the boilers in G2
and G3 (before they became subject to the tax).
The outcome variable Yijt corresponds to the ELV that applies to boiler i located in county j
at time t (expressed in mg NOx per MJ added energy). It is modeled as:
Yijt = + D_92i + G1 + D_92i G1 +
LX
l=1
lZil +
MX
m=1
{mXim +
PX
p=1
'pWjp + j + "ijt; (12)
where  is the time trend common to control and treatment groups,  is the treatment group specic
e¤ect (which accounts for average permanent di¤erences between treatment and control), and  is
the true e¤ect of treatment dened as the di¤erence in average outcome in the treatment group
before and after treatment minus the di¤erence in average outcome in the control group before and
after treatment. Moreover, Z is a vector of L boiler characteristics (e.g., size and type of fuel), X
is a vector of M rm characteristics (e.g., industrial sector, number of boilers and plants owned by
the rms, and ownership type), and W is a vector of P county characteristics (e.g, severity of NOx
pollution and importance of regulated rms for economic activity).8 Moreover j are county-xed
e¤ects that account for non-observable characteristics of the county that may a¤ect the stringency
of the ELVs, and "ijt is the error term.
For the sample of all boilers that were in operation by 1997, we estimate a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
model with multiple time periods, which allows us to verify that the e¤ect of the treatment is not
driven by a particular set of treated rms and that it is similar across time periods. The outcome
variable Yikjt (i.e., boiler i in group k = 1; 2; 3, located in county j at time t) is now modeled as:
Yikjt = + Gk + Dikt +
LX
l=1
lZil +
MX
m=1
{mXim +
PX
p=1
'pWjp + j + "ijt; (13)
where Gk are group xed e¤ects and Dikt is an indicator on whether boiler i in group k was
subject to the tax by time t (i.e., interaction between treatment and treatment having occurred by
8There are some indications from SEPA (2003) that the individual emissions standards are set di¤erently for
di¤erent industry sectors, with the heat and power sector and waste incineration possibly being subject to more
demanding emissions standards.
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period t).
Regarding boiler characteristics, from interviews with decision makers at the CABs, it was
suggested that larger boilers (in terms of installed capacity) generally provide better combustion
conditions and can have more advanced abatement technology installed enabling larger emissions
reductions. We therefore hypothesize that larger boilers obtain more stringent emissions standards
than smaller boilers. We control for this e¤ect by means of the variable Size, which measures the
installed capacity in MW. We also control for number of boilers located in the plant and for the
number of plants owned by the rm. Our hypothesis is that ELVs for the boilers located in plants
with several boilers (or owned by rms that have several plants) generally are more stringently
regulated.
The type of fuel and the sector in which the boiler is operated might also a¤ect the stringency
of the ELV. In particular, the EU directives for boilers used in waste incineration and at large
combustion plants specify that gas fuels (which are associated with relatively lower levels of NOx
emissions) are more stringently regulated than solid and liquid fuels (which are associated with
relatively higher levels of NOx emissions). The reason for this is that a larger share of emission
reduction percentage-wise can be achieved in boilers that use less NOx intensive fuels. We therefore
hypothesize that boilers that use relatively less NOx intensive fuels are more stringently regulated.
Firm ownership might also a¤ect environmental performance. The theoretical literature has
identied three major determinants of environmental performance associated with ownership: eco-
nomic e¢ ciency, willingness to internalize environmental externality, and bargaining power with
governments (see e.g., Wang and Wheeler 2005). Compared with public companies, private rms
may exhibit greater economic e¢ ciency, less bargaining power to elicit the stringency of environ-
mental regulations, and fewer incentives to internalize environmental externalities. To capture
di¤erences in the regulatory process between private and public rms we make use of the vari-
able Public, which takes a value of one for boilers owned by municipal/national rms, and zero
otherwise.
Regarding variation across counties, we hypothesize that decision makers impose more stringent
emissions standards in counties with more severe NOx associated environmental damages. The
decision makers may also impose less stringent standards in counties where there is greater concern
about economic activity and employment. We proxy the rst e¤ect by means of the highest
wintertime yearly average urban NOx concentration in the air measured in g=m3. We argue
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that it is a good proxy variable since it captures variations in the exposure of people and the
environment to NOx emissions. As a variable intended to capture the potential bargaining power
of a rm, we use the share of employees per sector out of all employed people in the county. The
assumption is that in counties where the sector in which a rms boiler belongs is of relatively large
importance employment-wise, the rm has a higher bargaining power vis-à-vis the decision maker.
Although the importance of a single rm (measured by the number of employees) would have been
a more direct measure, it was not possible to use due to lack of data.
Since a great deal of technological development in the areas of NOx reducing technologies has
taken place over time (see e.g., Bonilla et al. 2015 and 2018), we should expect the stringency of
ELVs to have increased across revisions. To account for this we include xed e¤ects per order of
the ELV (i.e., rst ELV, second ELV, etc.) and also run separate regressions for the subsample of
rst ELVs (as the factors a¤ecting regulatory stringency might be more prominent the rst time
a boiler is regulated). Finally, we estimate equations (12) and (13) with robust standard errors
clustered at county level to account for the potential correlation of the ELV decisions made by a
given county.
4.2 Evaluating the e¤ects of ELVs on actual emissions concentrations
Regarding the methodological approach to address our second research question, as previously de-
scribed, we only observe information regarding emissions concentration from the year 1992 onward
as such information is only available for the panel of rms subject to the NOx tax. Thus, we cannot
control for the value of the outcome variable before the treatment and only have information for
treated boilers. Hence, to test the hypothesis that emissions concentrations are mainly driven by
the NOx tax, we modify our methodological approach to a simple regression analysis. Our depen-
dent variable, which now corresponds to the actual concentration of NOx (expressed in mg NOx
per MJ added energy) is modeled as:
Cijt = + D_Yijt 1 +
LX
l=1
lZil +
MX
m=1
{mXim +
PX
p=1
'pWjp + j + "ijt; (14)
where Cijt corresponds to the actual emissionsconcentration for boiler i located in county j at
time t (expressed in mg NOx per MJ added energy). Our variable of interest is D_Yijt 1, which
corresponds to the lagged value of a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the boiler was
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subject to an ELV in the previous year and zero otherwise. If the ELVs have an e¤ect incentiviz-
ing further reductions on actual emissions concentration that those induced by the NOx tax, the
coe¢ cient  should be negative and statistically signicative.
As before, we control for boiler, rm, and county characteristics as well as county xed e¤ects.
Moreover, we estimate equation (14) with robust standard errors clustered at boiler level, and run
separate regressions for the sample of boilers already in operation by 1992 and the sample of all
boilers in operation by 1997.
Regarding boiler characteristics, the Swedish NOx database contains information about the
availability of technologies to reduce NOx emissions. Therefore, among the covariates we also
include a dummy variable accounting for the availability of such technologies.
4.3 Data
The data consists of an unbalanced pooled cross-section over time panel of boilers, where boilers
are observed every year from the year when they obtain the rst ELV (or from the rst year in the
NOx dataset in case of no ELV). In our sample, each boiler has received (on average) 1.80 ELVs,
and 294 boilers have obtained only one ELV during the whole sample period. The boilers that have
received more than one ELV have received (on average) 2.6 ELVs, and the average number of years
between revisions is 6.59.
Regarding the data sources, information about ELVs over the period 19802012 specied in
the operating licenses of combustion plants was obtained from county authorities. The information
on NOx emissions and production of useful energy necessary to establish the NOx tax liabilities
and refunds over the period 19922012 comes from the Swedish NOx database, which is a panel
covering all boilers monitored under the tax system. The NOx database also includes information
on whether NOx abatement technologies are installed at each boiler, boiler capacity, and shares
of di¤erent fuels in the fuel mix. Information about rm ownership was obtained from the Orbis
database.
County-level variables were collected from several di¤erent sources. A variable for the ambient
NOx concentration in a county was obtained from the Swedish Research Institute IVL Air Quality
Database (IVL, 2015). It includes data for most counties and years from 1986 and 2012. Data
concerning the share of employees per sector per county was also obtained from Statistics Sweden.
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See Table 2 for a description of the variables.
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Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
ELV mg/NOx 11477 110.77 50.22 21.90 300
NOx Concentration mg/NOx 7276 70.70 35.58 0.25 277
Treated 1 if subject to NOx tax; 0 otherwise 18386 0.66 0,47 0 1
OldBoiler 1 if existed in 1992; 0 otherwise 18386 0.57 0.49 0 1
Entrants92-96 1 if entered 1992-1996; 0 otherwise 18386 0.16 0.36 0 1
Entrants96-97 1 if entered 1996-1997; 0 otherwise 18386 0.06 0.24 0 1
# ELV # of ELV (1: rst ELV) 11477 1.67 0.91 1 7
Boiler Characteristics
Size Installed boiler e¤ect in MegaWatts 15503 51.42 89.92 1.3 825
Technology 1 if technology installed; 0 otherwise 11479 0.55 0.50 0 1
Gas Fuel 1 if boiler uses mainly gas fuel; 0 otherwise 12275 0.18 0.38 0 1
Liquid Fuel 1 if boiler uses mainly liquid fuel; 0 otherwise 12275 0.19 0.39 0 1
Solid Fuel 1 if boiler uses mainly solid fuel; 0 otherwise 12275 0.16 0.36 0 1
Biofuel 1 if boiler uses mainly biofuel; 0 otherwise 12275 0.47 0.50 0 1
Firm Characteristics
Waste 1 if waste sector; 0 otherwise 18386 0.10 0.30 0 1
Food 1 if food sector; 0 otherwise 18386 0.06 0.23 0 1
Heat and Power 1 if heat and power sector; 0 otherwise 18386 0.55 0.50 0 1
Pulp and Paper 1 if pulp and paper sector; 0 otherwise 18386 0.11 0.32 0 1
Metal 1 if metal sector; 0 otherwise 18386 0.03 0.16 0 1
Chemicals 1 if chemicals sector; 0 otherwise 18386 0.06 0.24 0 1
Wood 1 if wood sector; 0 otherwise 18386 0.09 0.28 0 1
# Boilers No. of boilers per plant 18386 4.07 3.64 1 21
#Plants No. of plants per rm 18386 3.64 5.61 1 29
Public 1 if publicly owned; 0 otherwise 18386 0.46 0.50 0 1
County Characteristics
NOx County Highest wintertime concentration air, g/m3 17053 27.38 14.68 0.6 63.4
EmployeesSector % employees in sector in which boiler is used 18386 6.66 2.11 0.82 12.8
Table 3: Summary Statistics
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Table 3 shows that 70% of our observations have been subject to the NOx tax at some point,
and that 79% were in operation by 1997. Moreover, there is large variation in the stringency of
ELVs and NOx emissions concentrations. Such variation reects di¤erences in, e.g., boiler size, fuel
mix, sector, and availability of technology. Most boilers have NOx-reducing technologies installed
(55%), the most common fuel used by boilers is biofuel (47%), and most of the boilers in the
dataset belong to the heat and power sector. Furthermore, 46% of the boilers in the sample are
owned by public companies (i.e., by municipalities or the national government). Regarding county
characteristics that might a¤ect the stringency of the ELV setting process, the highest wintertime
ambient NOx concentration ranges from 0.6 to 63.4 g/m3 across counties, with a mean of about 27
g/m3. As described before, values over 40 g/m3 are consistent with exceedances of the Swedish
Environmental Quality Standards. Finally, on average, 6.66% of the people employed in each
county works in the sectors in which the boilers in the sample are used.
5 Results
In what follows, we discuss the results of the econometric models.
5.1 ELVS are more stringent for boilers subject to the national tax
We rst compare the stringency of ELVs in G1 to the control group to verify the hypothesis that
ELVs are more stringent for boilers subject to both the standards and the tax. In cols (1) and
(2) of Table 4, we present the results of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence model specied in equation
(12), focusing on the boilers already in operation by 1992 (using only the information available
over the period 19801995). In col (1) we present the results for the subsample of rst ELVs
regulating the boilers in operation by 1992, while col (2) shows the results for the whole sample of
ELVs for the boilers in operation by 1992 (controlling for the order of the ELVs). Moreover, cols
(3)(5) present the results of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence model specied in equation (13), focusing
on the boilers already in operation by 1997 (and using the information available for the period
19802012). Col (3) refers again to the sample of rst ELVs while cols (4)(5) refer to the whole
sample of ELVs for the boilers in operation by 1997. Col (4) refers to boilers in all counties, while
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col (5) includes only boilers located in the ve counties where the Swedish Environmental Quality
Standards have been exceeded (e.g., it includes only the ELVs for the counties where ambient NOx
emissions concentration are higher than the legal limit to investigate whether the results are more
salient in counties with higher levels of pollution and industrial activity).
A negative sign of the coe¢ cient indicates that the determinant makes the ELV more stringent.
We observe that the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator Did_Gi is negative and statistically signi-
cant in almost all specications in cols (1)(5). This is to say, the stringency of the ELVs for those
boilers in G1 subject to the NOx tax increased after they became subject to the tax, and the same
holds for the stringency of the ELVs for boilers in G2 in specications (4)(5) and the stringency
of the ELVs for boilers in G3 in specications (3)(4).
Let us focus on the analysis of the results in cols (1)(2). As shown in the table, after the
treatment, the stringency of the ELVs for the boilers subject to the tax increased by 41.34 mg in
col (1) and by 42.53 mg in col (2). Moreover, the simple pre versus post estimator +  in cols (1)
and (2) is also negative and statistically signicant. This nding is in line with our expectations as
the stringency of the environmental legislation is likely to have increased over time and the average
ELV stringency should follow this trend. Note that  is positive and statistically di¤erent from
zero, indicating permanent average di¤erences in ELV stringency between the treatment groups
(in particular, in the absence of treatment, boilers exceeding the threshold of production of useful
energy to become subject to the NOx tax were allowed less stringent ELVs than boilers that produce
lower amounts of useful energy).9 However, such a di¤erence disappeared after the treatment since
 +  (the simple treatment versus control estimator that ignores pre-treatment outcomes) is not
statistically di¤erent from zero.
Regarding cols (3)(5), in col (3) the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator Did_Gi is negative not
only for boilers in G1 but also for boilers in G2 and G3. However, the increased ELV stringency for
boilers regulated under the tax is only statistically signicant for boilers in G1 and G3. In relative
terms, the size of G2 is small (6.6% of our observations, vs. 64% and 14% for G1 and G3), and
in col (3) we only analyze the subsample of rst ELVs. In cols (4) and (5), the sample includes
all ELVs for the boilers in operation by 1997, and the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator becomes
9Note that in randomized experiments, where subjects are randomly selected into treatment and control groups,
 should be zero as both groups should be nearly identical. However, in most program evaluation problems seen in
economics there is selection into the treatment.
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statistically signicant also for boilers in G2. Moreover, in line with the summary statistics in
Table 2, the results for the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimators in col (4) indicate that the increased
stringency of ELVs after the treatment is larger for G1 than for G3, and larger for G3 than for G2.
Thus, even if the e¤ect of the treatment is observed for all our three groups of boilers, the e¤ect is
the largest for the rst group of boilers being treated, followed much behind in magnitude by G3.
Regarding covariates, in cols (3)(5) we observe that the lagged value of the county-level con-
centration of NOx is a statistically signicant determinant of ELV stringency in period t, but this
e¤ect is not observed in cols (1)(2). Interestingly, the e¤ect of the ambient concentration of NOx
on ELV stringency is larger in the counties where the Swedish Environmental Quality Standards
have been exceeded; see col (5).
The share of employees per sector working in the regulated rms seem to only have mattered
when setting the rst ELV; see col (3). In such case, a larger share of employees working in regulated
rms translated into less stringent ELVs. In contrast, boiler size is an important determinant of
the ELVs in all specications. The results indicate that larger boilers obtain more stringent ELVs,
probably because they have better capacity to reduce emissions.
Regarding xed e¤ects for fuel, using the least NOx-intensive fuels (gas fuel) as the reference
dummy variable, we observe that, on average, the more NOx-intensive a fuel is, the less strictly
regulated it tends to be. Finally, in specications (2), (4), and (5) we also control for the order
of the ELVs. These xed e¤ects are all negative and statistically signicant, indicating that the
stringency of the ELVs has increased across revisions. As discussed before, this is to be expected
due to learning, technological progress, and adoption of NOx dedicated abatement technologies.
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ELVs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D_92 -3.59 4.58
G1 34.70 43.12 86.47 87.65 78.36
Did_G1 -41.34 -42.53 -67.51 -78.48 -71.93
G2 34.14 28.99 18.58
Did_G2 -17.31 -11.90 -11.45
G3 42.70 22.95 4.64
Did_G3 -24.94 -21.12 -12.81
Size -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.11
Boilers per Plant 1.67 -2.29 0.43 -0.25 1.16
Plants per Firm -0.21 -2.73 0.02 -0.83 -0.42
Public Firm -10.38 -8.74 -10.54 -8.18 -1.84
NOx County_1 -0.02 0.91 -0.55 -0.36 -0.67
EmployeesSector_1 -2.56 -0.04 12.45 -1.38 -8.31
FE Fuel YES YES YES YES YES
FE Sector YES YES YES YES YES
FE County YES YES YES YES YES
FE # ELV  YES  YES YES
#Obs 590 821 2137 5020 2837
#Boilers 135 159 220 327 175
R2 0.68 0.56 0.56 0.46 0.48
Table 4: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Model
Thus, we can conclude that the results provide empirical support to our hypothesis that the
ELVs are more stringent for boilers that are subject to the national tax. Moreover, the magnitude
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of the e¤ect of the tax on the ELV stringency seems to be larger for the group of boilers that rst
became subject to the tax.
5.2 Emissions Reductions are not driven by ELVS
Table 5 presents the results of the regression model specied in equation (14). In cols (1)(4), we
present the results for the sample of boilers subject to the NOx tax that were in operation by 1992,
while cols (5)(6) present the results for the sample of boilers subject to the NOx tax in operation
by 1997.
Regarding cols (1)(4), emissions concentrations are expected to decrease either through the
adoption of abatement technologies or if revisions of ELVs would impose further requirements on
boilers. In col (2), we control for the e¤ect of the availability of technology at time t 1 on emissions
concentrations at time t. In col (3), we also control for the e¤ects of ELV revisions through xed
e¤ects accounting for the order of the ELVs. Finally, since our theoretical model suggests that
ELVs are more likely to be binding when the share of tax revenues refunded to a county is small,
in col (4) we run the specication in col (3) only for the subsample of counties with lower shares
of the refunds (i.e., we exclude boilers located in Stockholm, Västra Götaland and Skåne since as
shown in Figure 3, they receive much larger shares of the refunds than other counties). Finally, in
col (5), we run the same specication as in col (3) for all boilers in operation by 1997, while col (6)
only includes the sample of boilers in operation by 1997 located in counties with low shares of the
NOx refunds.
The results in cols (1)(4) consistently indicate that when analyzing the sample of boilers
in operation by 1992, the only two variables a¤ecting rmsemissions reductions are size and the
existence of installed abatement technology. Indeed, in all specications, we observe no statistically
signicant emissions-reducing e¤ect of the ELVs. These results also hold when analyzing the
full sample of boilers in operation by 1997 (see col 5), but the e¤ect of the ELV on emissions
concentrations turns out to be slightly statistically signicant in col (6), which corresponds to the
sample of boilers in operation by 1997 in counties that receive lower shares of the NOx tax revenues.
Thus, the results seem to conrm our theoretical prediction that it is unlikely that ELVs induce
further emissions reductions than those induced by the NOx tax, and if so, this might happen in
counties that receive a low share of the tax refunds.
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Regarding covariates, in all specications we observe that boilers making using liquid and solid
fuels generate higher emissions concentration than boilers using natural gas and biofuels and boilers
in the pulp and paper sector generate higher emissions concentrations than boilers in other sectors.
The fact that emissions concentrations are mainly driven by boiler size, technology, and fuel
type is consistent with the rmsimplicit reaction function described in equation (3), which provides
support to our hypothesis that the NOx tax is the policy driving emissions reductions.
NOx Concentration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag_D_ELVt -6.79 -4.00 -6.89 -5.70 -6.79 -8.24
Size -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07
Boilers per Plant -1.31 -1.08 -1.20 -1.17 -0.73 -0.75
Plants per Firm -0.28 -0.19 -0.11 -0.03 -0.43 -0.08
Technology Installed_l -7.76 -8.14 -11.71 -7.69 -9.13
Public Firm -2.19 0.96 1.18 -0.72 -3.31 -5.70
NOx County_1 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.11 -0.03
EmployeesSector_1 0.56 -0.28 -0.35 -4.90 2.22 -1.12
FE Fuel YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE County YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE # ELV NO NO YES YES YES YES
#Obs 3297 3297 3156 1662 4388 2514
#Boilers 274 274 263 143 403 233
R2 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.35 0.21 0.26
Table 5: Drivers of Emissions Reductions
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6 Conclusions
Air quality control is often undertaken by means of policy mixes where not only national but also
local regulations are implemented. In this paper, we study the e¤ects of the interaction of national
and local policies on NOx emissions in Sweden, analyzing whether the coexistence of national and
local policies has increased the country´s ability to achieve emissions reductions. We conclude
that the implementation of the national tax has brought along stricter emissions standards over
time. Counties set more stringent emissions standards in response to the implementation of a
national uniform tax since stricter standards incentivize increased emissions reductions by local
rms, allowing counties to reduce the tax payment to the national government. However, the
increases in stringency of the local emissions standards have not been aggressive enough to induce
any reductions in emissions beyond those induced by the national uniform tax.
Why is the tax more e¤ective reducing emissions? Because a national uniform tax is set to a
level that is high enough to internalize air pollution spillovers across counties. In contrast, when
a county decides on the stringency of the local policies, it takes into account only local pollution
damages and abatement costs. Thus, the tax is simply more stringent than the standards, except
in the cases when the local damages of air pollution are quite high and the spillovers quite small.
When both policies are combined, local regulators have an incentive to increase the stringency of
the local standards as a means to reduce tax payments to the national government. Therefore, the
national tax leads local governments to internalize part of the e¤ects of their pollution in other
counties. However, for this mechanism to work, the revenues from taxing emissions should not
be fully refunded to the county. Otherwise, the incentive to increase the stringency of the local
standards in order to reduce the payment of the national tax disappears from the local regulators
objective.
The model in this paper is simplied in a number of respects to keep the analysis tractable.
For example, in reality, pollution spillovers are characterized by a much more complex pattern of
interregional relations than assumed in this paper. Such relations can be represented through a
pollution dispersion matrix that is a function of several climatic, geographic and technical factors,
such as the direction and average speed of the wind, the size of the region, the height of the source
of the emissions, and air turbulence. In this paper we disregard such complexities. Although this
simplication might a¤ect the conditions that dene when the standards are binding (as pollution
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from close neighbors would have a larger impact in a county than pollution from counties located
farther away), the analysis provides a useful starting point for assessing the economic incentives
provided by policy mixes. Finally, our paper provides a scal motivation to the response of the local
regulators to a national tax on polluting emissions. However, when deciding on the level of strin-
gency regulators face asymmetric information regarding the rmsabatement costs. Thus, a further
area of research concerns the informational value of the policy overlap. In particular, how local
regulators could make use of the information on the rmscosts provided by the implementation
of the tax to better target the standard on the rmstrue cost.
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Appendix A
To compare aggregate emissions reductions under a uniform national tax vs. decentralized
emissions standards, we assume that counties are symmetric in terms of the damages of air pollution
and costs of emissions reductions. Thus, we assume that Di(ei; E) = D(e;E) and Ci(ei) = C(e) 8
i; such that ei = e and E = ne. Under such assumptions, the uniform tax rate T in equation (4)
can be represented as:
T =

1 + n2
 @D(e;E)
@e
; (15)
and county i0s emissions reductions under the uniform tax rate T are determined by the solution
to:
 @C(e)
@e
=

1 + n2
 @D(e;E)
@e
: (16)
In contrast, from equation (6) it holds that emissions reductions under decentralized emissions
standards will be determined by the solution to:
 @C(e)
@e
= [1 + n]
@D(e;E)
@e
: (17)
Comparing equations (16) and (17), it is straightforward to say that emissions reductions under
the uniform tax rate are larger than under decentralized emissions standards, as the stringency of
the uniform tax takes into account the existence of interjurisdictional externalities.
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Appendix B
To investigate whether ELVs become the most restrictive policy instrument when combined
with a uniform national tax, we assume that counties are symmetric in terms of the damages of
air pollution and costs of emissions reductions. Thus, we assume that Di(ei; E) = D(e;E) and
Ci(ei) = C(e) 8 i; such that ei = e and E = ne. Under such assumptions, the uniform tax rate T
can be represented as:
T =

1 + n2
 @D(e;E)
@e
; (18)
Moreover, county i0s emission reductions under policy overlapping in equation (9) are deter-
mined by the solution to:
 @C(e)
@e
= [1 + n]
@D(e;E)
@e
+ T [1  ri] : (19)
Substituting equation (15) into equation (19), it holds that  @C(e)@e > T if:
[1 + n] >

1 + n2

ri;
or:
1 + n
1 + n2
> ri:
Let r = 1+n
1+n2
. ELVs will become binding when ri < r, while the uniform tax would be the
binding policy if ri > r: Moreover, note that since r > 1n , refunding tax liabilities uniformly
allocated across counties will lead to binding ELVs.
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Figure 4: Stringency of ELVs Over Time
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